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COMMENTS
The Institution of Bail as Related to Indigent
Defendants
The institution of bail and conditional release in criminal law
is viewed as a compromise between the conflicting considera-
tions of the traditional presumption of innocence, and the desire
to prevent an accused from taking flight from justice.' The pos-
sibility that an accused will violate his bail has been termed "a
calculated risk which the law takes as the price of our system of
justice."'2 Briefly stated, the purpose of bail is to insure that an
accused will be present when required to face the charges against
him, without the need for incarceration.3
Bail has been a continual source of legislative and judicial
controversy throughout its development. Determination of the
amount of bail has been one of the most difficult problems, and
recent conflict has manifested itself in a segment of this prob-
lem, that relating to the bail to be demanded of an indigent de-
fendant. Because one of the theoretical bases of bail is that a
threat of financial loss will exert sufficient deterrent pressure
against an attempted flight, problems are engendered when a
defendant is not possessed of sufficient property to bear the cost
of the bail.4
In a recent case5 involving an application by an indigent de-
fendant for a reduction in bail pending disposition of a writ of
certiorari to the Supreme Court, Mr. Justice Douglas, to whom
the application was directed, made some observations on the law
of bail as it relates to indigents which may be indicative of fu-
1. Foote, Comment on the New York Bail Study -Foreword, 106 U. PA. L.
REv. 685 (1958). See also Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 8 (1951) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
2. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 8 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring).
3. Bandy v. United States, 81 Sup. Ct. 197 (1960) ; Reynolds v. United States,
80 Sup. Ct. 30 (1959); Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951); United States v.
Foster, 278 F.2d 567 (2d Cir. 1960) ; United States ex rel. Rubinstein v. Mulcahy,
155 F.2d 1002 (2d Cir. 1946) ; State v. Clark, 234 Iowa 338, 341, 11 N.W.2d 722,
724 (1943), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 739 (1944) ; Craig v. Commonwealth, 288 Ky.
157, 161, 155 S.W.2d 768, 770 (1941) ; State v. Chivers, 198 La. 1098, 1102, 5
So.2d 363, 364 (1941) ; State v. Alvarez, 182 La. 50, 54, 161 So. 17, 18 (1935) ;
Ex parte Oliver, 127 Miss. 208, 210, 89 So. 915, 916 (1921) ; EW parte Malley,
50 Nev. 248, 256, 256 Pac. 512, 514 (1927) ; Manning v. State ex rel. Williams,
190 Okla. 65, 66, 120 P.2d 980, 981 (1942). Cf. LOUISIANA CODE OF CRIMINAL
PBOCEDURE REVISION, tit. VIII, art. 1 (April 1960 draft), which defines bail as
"the security given by the accused that he will appear before the proper court
whenever his appearance may be required therein."
4. Foote, Comment on the New York Bail Study-Foreword, 106 U. PA. L.
REv. 685, 686 (1958).
5. Bandy v. United States, 81 Sup. Ct. 197 (1960).
19611
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
ture judicial treatment of the problem. He expressed his con-
viction that the rule providing that security may be dispensed
with when there are other deterrents to flight6 might well prove
applicable in many cases involving a defendant too poor to fur-
nish security for a bond.
In order to 'place these statements in their proper historical
perspective, this Comment will survey the history of existing
state and federal rules governing the administration of bail, in
an attempt to examine the effect which Mr. Justice Douglas'
opinion may have on the law of bail.
History and Origin
The word bail is derived from the French term, bailler, which
means "to deliver."'7 It has been asserted that bail emanates
from the institution of hostageship,8 a procedure used in early
wars,9 in which the loss of the hostage was the result of
failure to fulfill a promise. A later development, lessening the
stringency of the hostageship arrangement, was the promise of
a surety to pay the wergeld, which was the "life price" on a free-
man in case of homicide, or a fine or compensation in the case of
lesser crimes.10 This idea of suretyship later became merged
with the "concept of keeper,"' 1 which involved the power of the
surety as the custodian of the accused,' 2 a power which still ad-
heres in both the English and American systems today.13 It
appears that sureties were generally required to be relatives of
friends of an accused,' 4 a requisite which is apparently still ob-
6. These alternative deterrents were: long residence in a locality, the ties of
friends and family, and the efficiency of modern police. Id. at 198.
7. WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 204 (2d ed. 1957).
8. deHaas, Concepts of the Nature of Bail in English and American Criminal
Law, 6 U. OF TORONTO L.J. 385 (1946) ; Comment, 35 VA. L. REV. 496, 497
(1949).
9. deHaas, Concepts of the Nature of Bail in English and American Criminal
Law, 6 U. OF TORONTO L.J. 385 (1946). See also 4 HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF
ENGLISn LAW 525, n. 8 (1923), wherein it is shown that at one time sureties
were described as "the Duke's living prison."
10. deHaas, Concepts of the Nature of Bail in English and American Criminal
Law, 6 U. OF TORONTO L.J. 385, 386 (1946).
11. 4 HOLDSWORTIi, A HISTORY OF ENGLIsH LAW 525, n. 8, 526, n. 2 (1923).
12. E.g., Foxall v. Barnett, 2 El. & B1. 928, 932, 118 E.R. 1014, 1015 (1853),
in which the court said, referring to the status of a person under bail, "by being
bailed, [he] was merely put into the hands of persons who might at any time have
replaced him in gaol." Anonymous, 6 Mod. 231, 87 E.R. 982 (1704) ("The bail
have their principal always upon a string, and may pull the string whenever they
please, and render him in their own discharge"). See also de~laas, supra note 8,
at 396; Longsdorf, Is Bail a Rich Man's Privilege?, 7 F.R.D. 309 (1945) ; Com-
ment, 35 VA. L. REV. 496, 500 (1949).
13. Comment, 35 VA. L. REV. 496, 498 (1949).
14. 4 BL. COMM. *297; Comment, 41 YALE L.J. 293, 297 (1931).
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served in England today.15 The first significant English bail
statute appeared in 1275, and categorized bailable and non-bail-
able offenders.16 In 1554 the procedure for obtaining bail was
clarified, and in 1688 the English Bill of Rights set out the right
to bail and the protection against excessive bail, 7 which rights
were carried into the United States Constitution in the eighth
amendment.' 8
English and American System Contrasted
The close personal relationship between accused and surety
required under the English bail system has been largely divested
in the United States through the widespread incidence of surety
companies and professional bondsmen.19 A further divestment
of this relationship sought to be possessed by the English system
is the acceptance of worthless sureties in many instances.2 0 The
practice of using surety companies in the United States received
its initial impetus from the decision of Leary v. United States2 '
in 1912, in which the Supreme Court held that a contract by
which the defendant agreed to indemnify the surety was not void
as against public policy. It was there stated that: "[T]he inter-
est to produce the body of the principal in Court is impersonal
and wholly pecuniary." (Emphasis added.)22 After this decision,
the majority of the states held that such indemnity agreements
are valid,2 3 and the American system may be said to have ac-
cepted the bail relationship as nearly synonymous with the ordi-
nary contract of suretyship.
Although the law pertaining to pre-trial bail has roots in
Anglo-Saxon institutions, the right to bail pending appeal "is
relatively an innovation. '24 In Hudson v. Parker,25 the Supreme
Court held that an accused may be admitted to bail "not only
after arrest and before trial, but after conviction and pending
15. HOWARD, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN ENGLAND 339, 340 (Macmillan ed. 1931).
16. 4 I-OLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 527 (1923).
17. Ibid.
18. U.S. CONST. amend. VIIi.
19. Waite, The Problem of Bail, 15 A.B.A.J. 71 (1929) ; Comment, 41 YALE
L.J. 293, 297 (1931).
20. Waite, The Problem of Bail, 15 A.B.A.J. 71, 73, n. 16 (1929).
21. 224 U.S. 567 (1912).
22. Id. at 575.-
23. See Comment, 52 CoLUM. L. REv. 147, 148, n. 9 (1952).
24. Longsdorf, Is Bail a Rich Man's Privilege?, 7 F.R.D. 309, 311 (1945).
25. 156 U.S. 277 (1894).
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a writ of error. '26 This rule is codified in Rule 46 (a) (2) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.2
General Rules Governing the Administration of Bail
From the eighth amendment, which directs that "excessive
bail shall not be required, ' 28 spring many statutory enactments,
on the state and federal levels, governing the law of bail. Section
66 of the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code announces
the generally accepted rule on the non-bailability of a person ac-
cused of a capital crime, before conviction, "if the proof is evi-
dent or the presumption great that he is guilty of the offense. '2 9
However, bail in non-capital cases is a matter of right in the
great majority of states.8 0 There has been some dispute as to
whether the right to bail in non-capital cases may be said to
emanate directly from the eighth amendment, as this amendment
only declares a prohibition against excessive bail, without pre-
scribing the cases in which bail is to be given. However, what
appears to be the prevailing view was expressed in a recent fed-
eral case,81 in which it was said:
"The right to bail before trial, except in capital cases, is
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. The Eighth Amendment
to the Constitution of the United States, which is a part of
the Bill of Rights, provides that 'excessive bail shall not be
required.' This clause has invariably been construed as guar-
anteeing the right to bail by necessary implication, and not
merely meaning that when allowed, bail shall not be ex-
cessive." 82
This right has always been provided in the federal system,
26. Id. at 285.
27. FED. R. CRim. P. 46(a) (2).
28. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
29. MODEL PENAL CODE § 66 (Official Draft 1930). The comparative state
provisions are collected id. at 338-43.
30. Ibid.
31. Trimble v. Stone, 187 F. Supp. 483 (D.D.C. 1960).
32. Id. at 484. See also United States v. Motlow, 10 F.2d 657 (7th Cir. 1926)
United States v. Fiala, 102 F. Supp. 899 (D. Ore.'1951). A contrary view is
somewhat supported by the case of Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952), which
would indicate that the right to bail is a purely statutory right. Four Justices
dissented on the ground that such a construction of the eighth amendment was
unduly restrictive. In a separate dissent Mr. Justice Burton said that the "amend-
ment cannot well mean that, on the one hand, it prohibits the requirement of bail
so excessive in amount as to be unattainable, yet, on the other hand, under like
circumstances, it does not prohibit the denial of bail, which comes to the same
thing." Id. at 569.
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originally by statute, and now in the form of Rule 46 (a) (1).83
Under the Federal Rules, allowance of bail after conviction is not
a matter of right, but is wholly discretionary and allowable only
when the case involves a "substantial question which should be
determined by the appellate court. '8 4 Most states also accord the
right to bail pending review in non-capital cases.85
As has been noted, the practice has grown up in this country
of utilizing the services of professional bondsmen as the primary,
and in some jurisdictions, almost the exclusive, source of bail.86
The professional bond contains either an express or implied con-
tract of indemnification by a levy on property the defendant has
furnished as collateral. Less frequently utilized sources of bail
are the cash, securities, or realty bonds of either the defendant
or a friend or relative.
Determination of the Amount of Bail
This area of bail is guided by the rule of the eighth amend-
ment that "excessive bail shall not be required. '8 7  The imple-
mentation of this rule, however, has been fraught with conflicting
considerations. Generally, bail must be fixed at a level reason-
ably calculated to assure the presence of the defendant at the
33. FED. R. CaIM. P. 46(a) (1) states that a person charged with a capital
crime may be admitted to bail by the court "in the exercise of discretion, giving
due weight to the evidence and to the nature and circumstances of the offense."
It is interesting to note that this rule differs from that which obtains in most
state provisions with reference to bail in capital cases, in that the Federal Rule
apparently gives the trial judge a wider discretionary control over the admission
to bail. The typical state constitutional provision directs that all "persons shall
be bailable by sufficient sureties, except the following: . . . persons charged with
capital offenses where the proof is evident or the presumption great. La.
CONST. art. I, § 12.
34. FED. R. CRIM. P. 46(a) (1) ; Bernacco v. United States, 299 Fed. 787 (8th
Cir. 1924) ; Garvey v. United States, 292 Fed. 591 (2d Cir. 1923) ; United States
v. St. John, 254 Fed. 794 (7th Cir. 1918) ; Ex parte Harlan, 180 Fed. 119 (N.D.
Fla. 1909) ; Ex parte Green, 165 Fed. 557 (S.D.N.Y. 1908) ; McKnight v. United
States, 113 Fed. 451 (6th Cir. 1902) ; United States v. Simmons, 47 Fed. 723
(S.D.N.Y. 1891).
35. MODEL PENAL CODE 364-66 (Official Draft 1930). The Louisiana provision
governing right to bail pending review is LA. CONST. art. I, § 12, which prohibits
the release on bail pending review of any felon, except where a sentence of less
than 5 years at hard labor is actually imposed, in which case the accused must
be admitted to bail.
36. Some random illustrations serve to point up the extent of this practice: in
1956, in New York County, not a single personal bail bond was posted (see Com-
ment, 106 U. PA. L. REV. 693, 704 (1958)) and it has been estimated that surety
companies write 95% of the bail in Detroit (see Comment, 102 U. PA. L. REV.
1031, 1061, n. 114 (1954)).
37. U.S. COST. amend. VIII. It is to be noted that although this provision
does not extend to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment to the Constitution, most states expressly implement this rule in their
own constitutions.
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trial when required, and the amount is determined by the judge,
according to the circumstances of the case. 8  Rule 46(c) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 9 sets forth the widely ac-
cepted factors which should be consulted in determination of bail
- nature and circumstances of the offense, the weight of the
evidence against the accused, the financial ability of the defend-
ant to give bail, and the character of the accused. Although the
fixing of bail is within the discretionary power of the trial judge,
an accused has the right to apply to the court for a reduction in
the bail on a showing that it is clearly disproportionate in view
of all the relevant considerations. 40 Upon a denial of this motion,
the proper federal procedure is by appeal to the court of appeal
from the order denying the reduction 41 or to seek review by a
writ of habeas corpus. 42 A similar procedure obtains generally
in the state courts.48
One frequent criticism of the administration of bail in the
United States is grounded on the fact that the amount is often
determined arbitrarily and in accordance with fixed schedules
which give little effect to various factors which should be con-
sulted prior to a final determination. 44 Speaking of this prac-
tice in a case in which it was contended by the defendants that
the lower court had fixed a "uniform blanket bail" based on the
nature of the charge, Mr. Justice Jackson remarked that this "is
a clear violation of Rule 46(c). Each defendant stands before
the bar of justice as an individual. '45 Recent studies indicate
that the ideal of individual treatment and the actual practice of
courts are separated by a gulf that "is so wide as to suggest that
38. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951) ; United States v. Weiss, 233 F.2d 463
(7th Cir. 1956); Heikkinen v. United States, 208 F.2d 738 (7th Cir. 1953);
Forest v. United States, 203 F.2d 83 (8th Cir. 1953) ; United States ex rel. Rubin-
stein v. Mulcahy, 155 F.2d 1002 (2d Cir. 1946) ; United States v. Motlow, 10
F.2d 657 (7th Cir. 1926) ; Ex parte Malley, 50 Nev. 248, 256 Pac. 512 (1927).
See also 1 ALEXANDER, THE LAW OF ARREST § 188 (1949) ; Comment, 102 U. PA.
L. REV. 1031, n. 1 (1954).
39. FED. R. CRIM. P. 46(c).
40. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951) ; Kraft v. United States, 238 F.2d 794
(8th Cir. 1957) ; United States v. Weiss, 233 F.2d 463 (7th Cir. 1956) ; United
States v. Stein, 231 F.2d 109 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 943 (1956) ;
Heikkinen v. United States, 208 F.2d 738 (7th Cir. 1953) ; Spector v. United
States, 193 F.2d 1002 (9th Cir. 1952) ; United States v. Brawner, 7 Fed. 86 (W.D.
Tenn. 1881).
41. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951) ; Cohen v. United States, 283 F.2d 50
(9th Cir. 1960).
42. United States ex rel. Rubinstein v. Mulcahy, 155 F.2d 1002 (2d Cir. 1946).
43. See, e.g., State v. Chivers, 198 La. 1098, 5 So.2d 363 (1941).
44. HALL, CRIMINAL LAW AND ENFORCEMENT 640 (1951); SUTHERLAND,
PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINOLOGY 230-31 (Lippincott ed. 1934) ; Comment, 106 U. PA.
L. REV. 693, 706 (1958).
45. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951) (Jackson, J. concurring).
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it cannot be bridged." 46 This practice of courts is in many cases
dictated by administrative necessity and will probably so remain
until provision can be made to alleviate the crush of business
with which many jurisdictions are faced. One writer has sug-
gested the establishment of a special bureau which would control
all granting of bail, including the investigation into the back-
ground of the applicant.47
Financial Ability of Defendant as Determinant of Bail"
Stress upon the financial ability of the defendant is based on
the proposition that a defendant who is deemed to be relatively
stable will not risk a forfeiture of his own property in an attempt
to flee justice, and some courts have, in relatively recent years,
been giving more credence to this factor as a determinant of
bail.48 This factor has been recognized in the tentative draft for
the proposed revision of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure.4 9 Although financial ability is admittedly a factor to be
considered, it is not "determinative of the matter,"50 and the
inability of a defendant to pay the bail does not render the
amount excessive.5 1 However, in the case of a person who is
unable to furnish security for a bail bond, any requirement of
bail will necessarily result in incarceration, which might be fol-
lowed by consequences prejudicial to the accused.5 2
Several means have been utilized in an attempt to avoid this
46. Comment, 102 U. PA. L. REV. 1031, 1070 (1954). See also Comment, 106
U. PA. L. REV. 685 (1958).
47. SUTHERLAND, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINOLOGY 232 (Lippincott ed. 1934).
48. E.g., Bennett v. United States, 36 F.2d 475, 477 (5th Cir. 1.929) : "The
amount of the bail bond in a criminal case is largely determined by the ability of
the defendant to give it, and what would be reasonable bond in a given case can
usually be best determined by the trial judge, because of his familiarity with the
facts and the financial ability of the defendant to give security."
49. The Louisiana State Law Institute's tentative proposal for revision of the
Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure would codify the Louisiana jurisprudential
rule that the financial ability of a defendant is to be considered as a factor in
fixing the bail amount. LOUISIANA CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE PROPOSED RE-
VISION tit. VIII, art. 8 (April 1960 Draft).
50. Ex parte Malley, 50 Nev. 248, 251, 256 Pac. 512, 514 (1927)
51. State v. Chivers, 198 La. 1098, 5 So.2d 363 (1941) ; State v. Alvarez, 182
La. 50, 161 So. 17 (1935) ; Heard v. Clark, 156 Miss. 355, 126 So. 43 (1930)
Em parte Malley, 50 Nev. 248, 256 Pac. 512 (1927).
52. See Foote, Comment on the New York Bail Study-Foreword, 106 U. PA.
L. REV. 685, 690-91 (1958), where some of the consequences of pretrial and post-
conviction detention are discussed, e.g.: the possibility of lower quality of the prep-
aration of the defendant's case, and the possible loss of employment of the de-
fendant, resulting in even less funds available to the accused. See also Comment,
102 U. PA. L. REV. 1031, 1048-59 (1952), where the effects flowing from deten-
tion, as revealed by a study of the administration of bail in Philadelphia, are
analyzed at length, and Comment, 106 U. PA. L. REV. 693, 722-29 (1958), a sim-
ilar analysis of conditions existing in New York City.
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problem. One is the release on a defendant's own recognizance,
which involves an obligation by him to comply with the condi-
tions of the bail undertaking without the need for any deposit of
security or bond. This method has been expressly provided for
in the Louisiana Law Institute's tentative draft for a revision
of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure.5" However, the
use of this device is limited to those persons who are financially
responsible, and there is a financial obligation involved, though
not one required to be substantiated by giving of security.5
Although the indigence vel non of a defendant has risen in
stature as a determinant of bail, difficult questions of policy are
presented when a defendant is proved to be an indigent and un-
able to raise any bail. Treating this type of situation, Blackstone
said "if the party cannot find bail, he is to be committed to the
county gaol." 5 This simple formula is reflected in a 1950 federal
case, 6 in which it was said that a "person arrested upon a crim-
inal charge, who cannot give bail, has no recourse but to move
for trial. '5 7 This view admits of no relief to the indigent in the
form of conditional release without security, and appears to rep-
resent the general attitude of the courts on this question.58
Bandy v. United States
The remarks of Mr. Justice Douglas in Bandy v. United
States59 cast some light upon the problem of a defendant who
cannot raise bail. There, on appeal from a conviction of fraudu-
lent filing of income tax returns, defendant sought leave to pro-
ceed in forma pauperis. The district court's certification that
the appeal was not taken in good faith resulted in denial of this
application.6" Defendant petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ
53. LOUISIANA CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE PROPOSED REVISION tit. VIII,
art. 26 (April 1960 draft) provides: "A person in custody may be released by
order of the court on his personal obligation to comply with the conditions of the
bail undertaking, and without the necessity of giving security."
54. Comment, 106 U. PA. L. REV. 693, 720-22 (1958).
55. 4 BL. COMM. *298.
56. United States v. Rumrich, 180 F.2d 575 (2d Cir. 1950).
57. Id. at 576.
58. United States v. Rumrich, 180 F.2d 575 (2d Cir. 1950) ; State v. Chivers,
198 La. 1098, 5 So.2d 363 (1941) ; State v. Alvarez, 182 La. 50, 161 So. 17
(1935) ; Ex parte Oliver, 127 Miss. 208, 89 So. 915 (1921) ; Ex parte Malley, 50
Nev. 248, 256 Pac. 512 (1927).
59. 81 Sup. Ct. 197 (1960).
60. Bandy v. United States, 272 F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1959). The denial resulted
from the operation of Rule 39(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
under which a defendant is to be denied leave to proceed in forma pauperis if
his appeal is shown to be in bad faith by a certification from the district court.
It is to be noted that the court appointed an attorney to assist the defendant in
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of certiorari, and, pending disposition of the petition, Mr. Justice
Douglas granted bail of $5,000. 61 Defendant subsequently ap-
plied to Mr. Justice Douglas for a release on "personal recog-
nizance," reciting that he was "unable to give security for the
prescribed bond. '62 The application was denied without preju-
dice for a renewed application in the lower court, in view of the
fact that the Supreme Court, in a per curiam decision on the
same day, had granted the motion for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis and the petition for a writ of certiorari, but had re-
manded the case to the court of appeal for a hearing of the
appeal. 68 In the course of passing on the application, the Justice
made statements which have bearing upon the problem under
discussion.
After setting forth the major premise upon which the insti-
tution of bail is bottomed, i.e., that the threat of loss of one's own
property will serve as an adequate safeguard against the risk
that the accused will flee, the opinion points out that the system
is based on the assumption that the defendant has property.64
Analogizing from the Griffin case,66 which held that an indigent
defendant is denied equal protection of the laws if denied an
appeal on equal terms with other defendants, the Justice then
posed the following quaere: "Can an indigent be denied freedom,
where a wealthy man would not, because he does not happen to
have enough property to pledge for his freedom?" 66 After a dis-
cussion of the ill effects which usually flow from incarceration
before conviction or during review, he said, "the right to release
is heavily favored, and . . . the requirement of security for the
bond may, in a proper case, be dispensed with. Rule 46 (d) in-
deed provides that 'in proper cases no security need be re-
quired.' "167
Thus, Mr. Justice Douglas, faced with the conflict between
"the need for a tie to the jurisdiction and the right to freedom
from unnecessary restraint," 68 appears to feel that in certain
showing that the appeal was not in bad faith, but later affirmed the conviction
on the ground that the defendant had failed to prove that he was in good faith.
Bandy v. United States, 278 F.2d 214 (8th Cir. 1960).
61. Bandy v. United States, 81 Sup. Ct. 25 (1960).
62. Id. at 197.
63. Id. at 244.
64. Id. at 197.
65. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
66. Bandy v. United States, 81 Sup. Ct. 197, 198 (1960).
67. Ibid.
68. United States ex rel. Rubinstein v. Mulcahy, 155 F.2d 1002, 1004 (2d Cir.
1946).
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cases the latter consideration must override the former, even at
the risk of according the defendant an unsecured freedom. This
concept departs from the traditionally accepted practices which
adhere in the United States presently, and seems pregnant with
a possibility of abuse and danger to the community. Apparently
realizing this, Mr. Justice Douglas advanced other deterrents to
jumping bail: long residence in a locality, the ties of friends and
family, and the efficiency of modern police. The third alterna-
tive would probably serve as some deterrent, but the effective-
ness of the first two alternatives in most cases is open to ques-
tion in view of the increased mobility of the modern criminal6 9
Another point in the opinion which seems to be at odds with
traditional bail precepts is the reference to allowing an indigent
to be set free on his "personal recognizance." The final draft
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure bears no explana-
tory comment on this portion of Rule 46 (d), although the pre-
liminary drafts of the rule did grant a permission to the court
to release defendants on a bail undertaking "without requiring
sureties or the deposit of cash or bonds or notes." 0 This method
of conditional release is apparently rarely used,7 1 but when util-
ized, represents a personal obligation of the defendant to appear,
and is inextricably bound up with the character and financial
ability of the accused. 72 Because of this, it is submitted that the
proviso in Rule 46 (d) that "in proper cases no security need be
required" was probably not intended to be interpreted so as to
allow a financially worthless person to come within the purview
of its terms. It is to be noted, however, that there may be cases
in which this method of conditional release could be utilized, even
69. See, e.g., Longsdorf, Is Bail a Rich Man's Privilege?, 7 F.R.D. 309, 311
(1945).
70. Bandy v. United States, 81 Sup. Ct. 197, 198 (1960), Mr. Justice Douglas'
footnote.
71. See Comment, 106 U. PA. L. REV. 693, 721 (1958), where a study of the
administration of bail in New York City revealed that only 88 out of a total
of 3,038 defendants were released on personal recognizance, or a general average
of 2.9%.
72. Ewing v. United States, 240 Fed. 241, 246 (6th Cir. 1917). The proposed
revision of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure defines a personal recog-
nizance as "a personal obligation to comply with the conditions of the bail under-
taking . . .without the necessity of giving security." The comment to this article
sets out the reasons for the passage of such legislation : to relieve the defendant of
the hardships of bail, to diminish contacts between defendants and occasional
bondsmen-lawyer combinations, and to alleviate the overcrowding of detention fa-
cilities. Emphasis is placed on the requirement that the accused be a financially
responsible person, and this is the requisite that makes the release on personal
recognizance consistent with the underlying purpose of bail. LOUISIANA CODE OF
CRIMINAL PRocEnunE Pnoposgn REVISION tit. VIII, art. 26 (April 1960 draft).
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though the defendant could be termed an "indigent."73 Such a
situation would be that of a college student who is personally
impecunious, but whose family is well established in the com-
munity. This person would fit nicely into the classification of
an "indigent" but would rarely flee, even though no security was
involved in his conditional release, because the requisite assur-
ance that the accused will appear for trial has been provided by
strong family ties. This type of situation, probably not excep-
tional, points up the close affinity between the "release on per-
sonal recognizance," which involves a prospective financial
undertaking by the accused, and the procedure of "release on
parole," in which there is no attendant financial obligation.7 4 In
the above hypothetical case, it can be seen that, if the judge de-
cides that the defendant is sufficiently bound to the jurisdiction
by other than financial deterrents, he has the discretionary
power to release the accused on his personal recognizance, set-
ting the bail undertaking at a nominal amount. It is in this con-
text that the two procedures become closely akin in actual prac-
tice. As applied to the class of "indigents" who do have suffi-
cient non-proprietary ties to the community, this procedure
might not be objectionable. However, if the remarks in the opin-
ion are applied to all indigents, regardless of their standing in
the community, detrimental inroads may be made into the pri-
mary objective of bail: to have the accused present at his trial.
Conclusion
Because of the departures which Mr. Justice Douglas' opinion
makes from theoretical and practical bail considerations, it is
submitted that a full implementation of the doctrines set forth
therein would be less than desirable. In an article appropriately
73. "Indigent" is defined by Webster's as one who is "destitute of property,
or means of comfortable subsistence; needy; poor; in want; necessitous." WEB-
sTEn's NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1266 (2d ed. 1957). However, there is
a generally recognized distinction between an "indigent" and a "pauper." The
former is sometimes classified as a person who has "no property or source of in-
come sufficient for their support aside from their own labor, though self-support-
ing when able to work and in employment." BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY 913 (4th
ed. 1951). Thus, the coverage of the term extends beyond the impecunious, poverty-
stricken person, who would more correctly be categorized a "pauper."
74. An illustration of this method of release is a New York provision ap-
plicable to city magistrates: "In all cases where a defendant charged with a crime
or offense is before a city magistrate, and such magistrate is authorized to admit
him to bail, the magistrate may, in his discretion parole the defendant if reason-
ably satisfied that the defendant will appear when wanted." N.Y. City Crim. Cts.
Act § 103, quoted in Comment, 106 U. PA. L. REV. 693, 721 (1958).
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entitled "Is Bail a Rich Man's Privilege?"7 5 there appears a pas-
sage apposite to this problem:
"Judges cannot be asked to release a prisoner on his own
recognizance in all cases where the prisoner has no means to
procure bail. If it were possible to provide for bail in forma
pauperis, Congress only could so provide. '76
It is believed that the best interests of society would be served
by giving more credence to the historical bases of bail, more in-
dividual treatment of bail applications, and by disallowing free-
dom to those persons who are unable to make a proper showing
of sufficient non-proprietary deterrents to flight, or to provide
the proper security necessary to furnish the needed "tie to the
jurisdiction."
James A. George
Effect of False Financial Statements on Debts
Discharged in Bankruptcy--
Section 17a(2) of the Bankruptcy Act
The policy of the Bankruptcy Act from its inception through
the latest amendments by the Eighty-Sixth Congress has been
to permit the financial rehabilitation of a debtor so as to allow
him to resume a producing place in the economy.' To this end
under certain conditions a debtor is allowed to petition for a
discharge from his obligations.2 However, under Section 14c of
the Bankruptcy Act, creditors of the bankrupt are allowed to
file objections to the discharge, one ground for objection being
the fact that the bankrupt has obtained money or property on
credit or as an extension or renewal of credit by issuing a false
financial statement in writing. Further, even after the bank-
75. 7 F.R.D. 309 (1945).
76. Id. at 312.
1. 6 AM. JuR. Bankruptcy § 676 (rev. ed. 1950).
To this end "exceptions are confined to those plainly intended, and the excep-
tions are to be strictly construed in favor of the bankrupt." 8 REMINGTON,
BANKRUPTCY 170 (1955). Davison-Paxon Co. v. Caldwell, 115 F.2d 189 (5th
Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 564 (1941). Contra, Hancock v. Blumentritt,
269 S.W. 177 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925).
2. Bankruptcy Act § 14a, 11 U.S.C. § 32a (1958).
3. Bankruptcy Act § 14c, 74 STAT. 408 (1960), 11 U.S.C.A. § 32c (Supp.
1960). The major change effected by this amendment is to allow a false financial
statement to be a bar to the discharge of only a busine8sman. The legislative his-
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